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Abstract
Consider a situation where a user’s credential is linked with DNA sequences. This credential can be used
to construct a confidential message, which is decipherable by someone who is the relative of the encryptor, i.e.,
the person who has similar DNA sequences. We would like to have a system that provides privacy-preserving,
in the sense that nobody will learn whether the encryptor is truly the ancestor of the recipient, except the fact
whether the recipient can decrypt the given ciphertext or not. We present a system to realize this complex
access control on encrypted data, such that the attributes used to describe a user’s credential will determine
a policy as to which recipient will be able to decrypt the provided ciphertext. To enhance the system, we
add an extra feature, namely a token controlled decryption. A ciphertext can be delivered to a receiver, but
the ciphertext cannot be decrypted until the token is provided. We provide a realistic scenario to capture
this situation. We formalize the security model of our system against chosen ciphertext attacks, malicious
adversaries and collusion attacks. Furthermore, we show an efficient and provably secure construction.
Index Terms
Attribute-Based Encryption, Embedded-Token Public Key Encryption.
I. Introduction
Consider the following real life scenario. A millionaire Alice would like to make an encrypted will, which
contains her secret Swiss bank account, to be given to her descendents. To simplify the scenario and without
losing generality, we assume that Alice has only one son, named Bob. When making her will, Alice constructs a
ciphertext (containing the secret Swiss bank account), which is a message encrypted with Alice’s DNA sequences.
Then, Alice provides the ciphertext to her family (this ciphertext can eventually be published), which will later
be stored in a secure cloud storage. Additionally, Alice creates a secret “token”, which is given to her lawyer.
After Alice passes away, Bob could first retrieve the ciphertext. Additionally, Bob will require the secret token
from the lawyer to allow a successful decryption. Finally, Bob will need to use his DNA to conduct a successful
decryption. The decryption is successful if and only if Bob is a real direct descendent of Alice (i.e., Bob passes
the DNA parentage test). One may wonder why the secret token is required in this scenario. This is to stop
Bob to conduct an early decryption, i.e., the case where Alice is still alive, but Bob just wants to take Alice’s
money away. Since the lawyer has been sworn to keep the secret token until the time when Alice passes away,
then Bob will not be able to conduct a successful decryption, even if he satisfies all other criterias required.
Furthermore, a third party Charlie will not be able to conduct a successful decryption, even if he collides with
the lawyer, since Charlie does not have the required DNA sequences, and hence, he will fail the DNA parentage
test. We note that this also captures the situation where the lawyer is dishonest and would like to decrypt the
ciphertext himself/herself. Note that in this situation, Charlie will not learn about anything else other than the
unsuccessful decryption process.
A. DNA Parentage Test [18]
DNA Parental test is currently the most advanced and accurate technology to determine parental relationship.
It uses genetic fingerprints to determine whether two individuals have a biological parent–child relationship.
Hence, it establishes genetic evidence whether a man/woman is the biological father/mother of an individual.
When testing parental relationship, the result (called the “probability of parentage“) is 0 when the parent is
not biologically related to the child, and it is typically closed to 1 (but is not necessarily equal to 1) otherwise.
Some but rare individuals are called ”chimeras”, due to the fact that they have at least two different sets
of genes. Nevertheless, almost all individuals have a single and distinct set of genes. Therefore, we met several
cases of DNA profiling that falsely “proved” that a mother was unrelated to her children. Since this has a
negligible probability in theory, we assume that these exceptions are not applicable in our protocol.
In the following, we give some useful definitions to explain the genetics vocabulary that will be used throughout
this paper.
Definition 1 (DNA) Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a molecule that encodes the genetic information found
in all human organisms, as a sequence of nucleotides using letters G, A, T, and C, corresponding to guanine,
adenine, thymine, and cytosine, respectively. The molecule is double-stranded helices, consisting of two long
polymers of simple units called nucleotides (molecules with backbones made of alternating sugars and phosphate
groups). These characters allow the DNA to be well-suited for biological information storage.
Definition 2 (Chromosome) A chromosome is an organized structure of DNA found in cells. This single
piece of coiled DNA contains many genes, regulatory elements and other nucleotide sequences. It also holds
DNA-bound proteins, which serve to package the DNA and control its functions.
Definition 3 (Allele) An allele is the alternative forms of the same gene for a character, producing different
effects. For instance, different alleles can result in different observable phenotypic traits, such as different
pigmentation. However, many variations at the genetic level result in little or no observable variation.
Definition 4 (Minisatellites) Minisatellites (or VNTR for Variable Number Tandem Repeat) are repeated
combined sequences, such that the size of one sequence is 10 to 60 nucleotides. They are present in all species
and are particularly studied in humans, and largely found in the genome. We can easily observe replication
errors in these minisatellites, including replication slippage, which are at the origin of interindividual on the
number of repetition variations. This variability has many applications, as for DNA Parentage test.
Principle of DNA Parentage Test
Child
Father Mother
Case 1
Father Mother
Child
Case 2
Figure 1. DNA Parentage Test. In Case 1, the father and the mother have biological parent–child relationship with the child since
the child’s chromosomes matches one chromosome of each parents’ pair. However, in Case 2, the father is not the biological father
of the child since they do not share any common chromosome.
Each individual has in its chromosomes portions of DNA that encode genes and other for which no usefulness
has yet been discovered. This last part has an interesting characteristic: some sequences of nucleotide pairs
follow on from each other, identically repeated. These repeated sequences are called minisatellites. The size of
these minisatellites, corresponding to the number of repetitions of DNA sequences, highly varies from person
to person, comprised from 5 to 55.
This size is a characteristic of the chromosome. Therefore, it inherits in the same way that its alleles: for
each chromosome pair of an individual, there will be one that will match the characteristics of the father and
another to those of the mother.
Thus, parental testing is to assess the size of some specific minisatellites. For each chromosome, we need to
compare these characteristics between the chromosomes of the child and those of the prospective parents. Then,
we can reach some conclusions. To illustrate this idea, please refer to the example below and Figure 1.
Example. Let us consider the following example. The following table contains genetic maps of three people:
the mother Alice and two presumed sons, labelled as Buz and Charles, respectively. In the table, the size
of minisatellite ACGCC is indicated for each chromosome pair. For instance, Alice has the sequence ACGC-
CACGCCACGCCACGCCACGCCACGCCACGCC (number of repetitions = 7) on its first chromosome 14.
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Analyzed Size of the minisatellite
chrom. pair Alice Buz Charles
Chrom. pair 1 18, 15 5, 15 18, 13
Chrom. pair 8 13, 14 17, 20 55, 14
Chrom. pair 13 34, 15 34, 9 34, 14
Chrom. pair 14 7, 24 5, 14 12, 7
We note that for each chromosome pair, Alice and Charles have one element in common. However, Alice and
Buz have only one element in common for the chromosome pair number 1 and the chromosome pair number
13, thus the Buz is not Alice’s biological son. Morevoer, we can conclude with a high probability (included in
[0,1)) that Charles is the biological son of Alice.
B. Related work
In 1984, the seminal notion of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) schemes was introduced by Shamir [20]. In
these schemes, an authority distributes keys to users with associated identities, and messages are encrypted
directly to identities. Shamir did not provide any concrete construction of IBE in [20]. Subsequently, Boneh-
Franklin [6] gave the first construction, which was proven secure in the random oracle model. Afterwards,
several improvements of this construction have been proposed in the literature. Selectively secure schemes
in the standard model were constructed ([7],[4]), then fully secure IBE schemes in the standard model were
proposed [5],[21]. The functionality of IBE has also been expanded, which includes a hierarchical structure
on identities, where identities can delegate secret keys to their subordinate identities [12],[14]. This particular
scheme is called a Hierarchical IBE (HIBE). Moreover, other techniques have been proposed to enhance the
security. The dual system encryption methodology was leveraged to obtain fully secure IBE and HIBE systems
from simple assumptions [22] and then, extended to obtain a fully secure HIBE system with constant size
ciphertexts [15].
In 2005, Sahai and Waters [19] introduced the concept of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). Inspired by
their scheme, two important but different constructions emerged, namely Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption (the keys are associated with the sets of attributes and the ciphertexts are associated with the
access policies) and Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (a ciphertext is related to a set of attributes and
each private key corresponds to an access policy over the attributes). Goyal et al. [13] proposed the first KP-ABE.
In an ortoghonal direction, Bethencourt et al. [3] proposed the first CP-ABE. Later on, the first fully expressive
CP-ABE scheme was proposed by Waters [23]. As for IBE, using the dual system encryption methodology,
Lewko et al. [16] proposed a stronger secure CP-ABE which leads to some loss of efficiency compared to the
most efficient scheme proposed by Waters [23].
In 2005, Baek et al. [1] introduced a new public-key encryption (PKE) scheme, called Token-Controlled
PKE (TC-PKE), where individual messages can be encrypted and sent to every receiver, but the latter cannot
decrypt the message until he/she is given an extra piece of information, known as the token. Later on, Galindo
and Herranz [11] added a new security property to thwart that the same ciphertext could decrypt to different
messages under different tokens. In 2007, Chow [9] constructed a TC-PKE in the standard model.
Trivial Solution that will not work. At the first sight, one may think to incorporate the notion of attribute-based
encryption (ABE) schemes, where the characteristic information elements related to Alice’s DNA sequences
can be viewed as attributes. Unfortunately, this method will not work due to the following. First, we note that
the ABE schemes will not stop Bob from decrypting the ciphertext if he satisfies the policy (i.e., the DNA
sequences), and therefore, this will not solve the scenario above. Second, the attributes used to produce the
ciphertext in the encryption phase are not exactly the same as the ones used to decrypt the ciphertext. Indeed,
if Bob is Alice’s son, then Bob only has half of Alice’s DNA, since the other half comes from Alice’s husband.
Therefore, we need to establish a method to verify which attributes are in common between Alice and Bob in
order to allow the decryption to proceed, and this task is not a trivial one.
C. Our Contributions
Motivated by the earlier scenario, we are interested to provide a solution to enable the mechanism to encrypt
data using the DNA information of the sender. Then, we allow the receiver to use his DNA information to
decrypt the ciphertext, if and only if his DNA sequences match the original DNA information used to construct
the ciphertext. The matching criteria is done via the parentage test, since DNA has an interesting and useful
characteristic, namely the number of repetitions is specific of each individual. These minisatellites’ size of each
pair of chromosomes will be treated as attributes and they are used in the encryption/decryption process.
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Furthermore, the solution is privacy-preserving, which means that at the end of the protocol no party will learn
about anything else with regards to the DNA information.
We provide a new cryptographic primitive called Token-Controlled Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based En-
cryption (TC-CP-ABE). We bring the security model for this primitive, and afterwards propose a scheme that
satisfies the model. We prove that our scheme is selectively IND-CCA secure under the Decisional Parallel
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption, secure against malicious adversaries and collusion resistant. We
need to highlight that the requirement of collusion resistance is hard to achieve. Our scheme is inspired by
Waters’ ABE scheme, a set intersection protocol and a token-controlled protocol. Nevertheless, we need to
stress that a simple and trivial combination of the existing schemes simply will not work, and hence insecure.
D. Organization of the Paper
In the next section, we will review some notations that will be used in our definition of the TC-CP-ABE
scheme. In section III, we will concentrate on formulating the definition of our scheme. We will present our
new construction in Section IV as well as its security and efficiency analysis. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section V.
II. Cryptographic tools
In the following, we provide some formal definitions of the cryptographic tools that will be used throughout
this paper.
A. Access Structure [2]
Definition 5 Let {P1, · · · ,Pn} be a set of parties. A collection AS ⊆ 2{P1,··· ,Pn} is monotone if the following
implication is satisfied for all B,C: B ∈AS∧B ⊆C⇒C ∈AS. An (monotone) access structure is a (monotone)
collection AS ⊆ 2{P1,··· ,Pn} \ {∅}. We define the sets in AS as the authorized sets (we say also that these set
satisfy AS) and the sets not in AS as the unauthorized sets.
In our context, the role of the parties is taken by the attributes. Thus, the access structure AS will contain
the authorized sets of attributes.
B. Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme (LSSS) [2]
Definition 6 Let Pi be a secret-sharing scheme over a set of parties P . Pi is said linear over Zp if:
1) The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2) There is a l×n matrix M (the share-generating matrix for Π). For all i = 1, · · · , l, the i-th row of M ,
written as Mi, is labeled by a party ρ(i), where ρ : {1, · · · , l} → P . Let v = (s,r2, · · · , rn) be a column
vector, where s ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared, and r2, · · · , rn ∈ Zp be randomly chosen. Thus, Mv is the
vector of l shares of the secret s according to Π. The share (Mv)i belongs to party ρ(i).
A SSS which is linear, satisfies the following linear reconstruction property. Let Π be a LSSS for the access
structure AS, S ∈ AS be any authorized set (i.e. S satisfies AS), and I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S} ⊂ {1, · · · , l}. Therefore,
there exist constants {wi ∈ Zp}i∈I satisfying the following implication: {λi} are valid shares of any secret s
according to Π⇒
∑
i∈I wiλi = s.
Convention: The vector (1,0, · · · ,0) is the target vector for any LSSS. Let I be a set of rows of M . If I is
an authorized set, then (1,0, · · · ,0) is in the span of I. If I is an unanthorized set, then (1,0, · · · ,0) is not in the
span of I. There is a vector w such that w · (1,0, · · · ,0) =−1 and ∀i ∈ I,w ·Mi = 0.
C. Bilinear Map
Definition 7 Let G and GT be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p∈Θ(2k) (where k is the security
parameter). Let g be a generator of G and eG×G→GT be a bilinear map with the following properties:
1) Bilinearity: ∀u,v ∈G,∀a,b ∈ Zp,e(ua,vb) = e(u,v)ab,
2) Non-degeneracy: e(g,g) 6= 1GT .
G is said to be a bilinear group if the group operation in G and the bilinear map e are both efficiently computable.
We can easily see that e is symmetric since e(ga,gb) = e(g,g)ab = e(gb,ga). Let BSetup denote an algorithm
that on input the security parameter k, outputs the parameters (p,g,G,GT ,e) as defined above.
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D. Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption [23]
Waters [23] introduced the Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption and showed
that it is secure in the generic group model. This assumption can be viewed as a generalization of the Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption.
Definition 8 Let G be a group of prime order p ∈ Θ(2k). Let a,s,b1, · · · , bq ∈ Zp be chosen at random and g
be a generator of G. If an adversary A is given ~y:
g,gs,ga, · · · ,ga
q
,ga
q+2
, · · · ,ga
2q
,
∀1≤ j ≤ q,gs·bj ,ga/bj , · · · ,ga
q/bj ,ga
q+2/bj , · · · ,ga
2q/bj ,
∀1≤ j,k ≤ q,k 6= j,ga·s·bk/bj , · · · ,ga
q·s·bk/bj ,
it must remain hard to distinguish e(g,g)aq+1s ∈GT from a random element in GT .
An algorithm B that outputs z ∈ {0,1} has advantage ε in solving Decisional q-Parallel BDHE in G if:
| Pr[B(~y,T = e(g,g)a
q+1s) = 0]−Pr[B(~y,T =R) = 0] |≥ ε
The Decisional q-Parallel BDHE assumption holds if no polytime algorithm has non-negligible advantage in
solving the Decisional q-Parallel BDHE problem.
E. Target Collision Resistant Hash Function
Target Collision Resistant (TCR) hash function was introduced by Cramer and Shoup [10].
Definition 9 A TCR hash function H guarantees that given a random element x which is from the valid
domain of H, a PPT adversary A cannot find y 6= x such that H(x) = H(y). We let AdvTCRH,A = Pr[(x,y)←
A(1k) :H(x) =H(y),x 6= y,x,y ∈DH] be the advantage of A in successfully finding collisions from a TCR hash
function H, where DH is the valid input domain of H, k is the security parameter. If a hash function is chosen
from a TCR hash function family, AdvTCRH,A is negligible.
F. Miscellaneous Definitions
Without losing generality, we can extend our scheme to allow grandparents and grandchildren as actors. For
simplicity, we assume that we have both the DNA of the grandfather and of the grandmother. From that,
we obtain a intersection set of cardinality U (in order to get enough matching elements for security point of
view). Nevertheless, we differentiate the scheme Parent-Child and Grandparent-Grandchild. Indeed, for the
former scheme, we construct the system such that grandchildren cannot collude their DNA sets in order to
have enough elements matching the DNA set of their grandparent (we only allow children to try to decrypt the
ciphertext). However, for the latter scheme, if a child of the two parents tries to decrypt the ciphertext, we can
easily see that all the elements of the child’s set match with the elements of the parents’ set, that will not be
the case for the grandchild.
G. Notations
We let S = {SP1 , . . . ,SPU } where SPi = {xi,1,xi,2} is the set corresponding to the numbers of sequences for
the minisatellite Xi on the parent’s chromosome pair i. In the same way, we define S′ = {SC1 , . . . ,SCU } and
SCi = {x̂i,1, x̂i,2} as the set corresponding to the numbers of sequences for the minisatellite Xi on the child’s
chromosome pair i. We recall that ∀i ∈ [U ], |SPi ∩SCi | ≥ 1, giving that |S∩S′| ≥ U for |S|= |S′|= 2U . We note
that the parent can be seen as the encryptor, the child as the decryptor and the lawyer as the proxy (untrusted
party) in our scheme. The lawyer has to follow a particular requirement: he/she enables the child to decrypt
the ciphertext at the appointed time by forwarding an extra piece of information, known as the “token”.
In this paper, we consider the Token-Controlled Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption schemes, and
we let the access structure be AS = (x1,1 ∨x1,2)∧ (x2,1 ∨x2,2)∧ ·· · ∧ (xU,1 ∨xU,2). We assume that the access
structure is written in good order: we mean that the first pair (x1,1∨x1,2) corresponds to the first chromosome
pair, the second pair (x2,1∨x2,2) to the second chromosome pair, and so forth. Moreover, for one pair of numbers,
the first element is associated to the left chromosome and the second element to the right chromosome. Once the
token is released, the child should decrypt the message of this parent using the set S∩S′ which must satisfiy AS.
A probabilistic polynomial time algortihm will be named in short as PPT algortihm. If Set is a non-empty
set, then x∈R denotes that x has been randomly and uniformly chosen in Set. Additionally, if Alg is an (PPT)
algorithm, then x←Alg( ) that Alg has been executed on some specified inputs and its (random) output
has been assigned to the variable x. Finally, for a positive integer N , let [N ] be equal to {1, · · · ,N}.
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III. Token-Controlled Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (TC-CP-ABE)
TC-CP-ABE (See Figure 2) is a new cryptographic primitive where a sender should express how he/she wants
to share data in the Encryption algorithm, by providing a predicate. Moreover, the receiver has a secret key
associated with his/her credentials or attributes. More precisely, the receiver with credentials x decrypts the
ciphertext encrypted using the predicate f if f(x) = 1. In order to get the correct x, the receiver needs to learn
the intersection of his/her credentials set with the one of the sender, but without learning nothing else about
the credentials that are not in common.
In addition, TC-CP-ABE scheme is an encryption scheme where the messages are encrypted by a public
key together with a secret token, such that the receiver holding the corresponding secret key cannot decrypt
without the respective token. The sender has to delegate the token to an untrusted party (eg. a proxy) a priori.
Subsequently, the proxy is responsible for releasing the token when some predefined conditions occur.
Matches
Matches
Alice’s DNA
(parent)
Bob’s DNA
(child)
Chrom. 1
Chrom. U
Chrom. 1
Chrom. U
Proxy
(notary)
Encrypt(SAlice,MAlice) when TK is released,
Encrypt(SAlice,MAlice)
token TK
Figure 2. Token-Controlled Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
A. Formal Definition
Definition 10 A Token-Controlled Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption scheme consists of the fol-
lowing five algorithms:
1) (PK,MSK)← Setup(k,U): on input a security parameter k ∈N and an attribute universe U , output the
public parameters PK and a master secret key MSK.
2) TK←TokGen(k): on input a security parameter k ∈ N, output the token TK.
3) SKS ← KeyGen(PK,MSK,S): on input PK, MSK and an attribute set S that describes the key,
output a private key SKS for S. Note that like traditional CP-ABE, each private key SKS is associated
with an attribute set S.
4) CT(M,ρ)←Encrypt(PK,S,(M,ρ),M,TK): on input PK, an access structure (M,ρ) for attributes over
U and a set of attributes S satisfying the access structure (M,ρ), a plaintextM∈{0,1}k and a token TK,
output a ciphertext CT(M,ρ). We assume that the access structure is implicitly included in the ciphertext.
5) M←Decrypt(PK,S,SKS ,CT(M,ρ),TK): on input PK, an attributes set S and its corresponding private
key SKS , a ciphertext CT(M,ρ) and a token TK, output a plaintext M if S satisfies (M,ρ) where S is
defined as the intersection set between S and the attribute set from Encrypt algorithm, or a symbol ⊥
indicating either CT(M,ρ) is invalid or S does not satisfy (M,ρ).
For simplicity, we omit PK in the expression of the algorithm inputs in the rest of the paper.
Correctness: For any k ∈ N, any attribute set S such that S ⊆ U , with its cardinality polynomial to k, any
access structure (M,ρ) for attributes over U and any messageM∈{0,1}k, if (PK,MSK)← textbfSetup(k,U),
TK←TokGen(k), SKS′←KeyGen(MSK,S′), for all attribute set S′ used in the system, we have Decrypt(S′,SKS′ ,
Encrypt(S,(M,ρ),M,TK),TK) =M, where S satisfies (M,ρ) and S satisfies (M,ρ) such that S = S∩S′.
In KeyGen algorithm, we assume the existence of a central trusted party that knows a secret master key
and distributes the secret attibute keys to eligible users.
In TokGen algorithm, we assume the existence of an untrusted party (eg. a proxy) that knows the token
and releases it to eligible users at the appointed time.
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B. IND-CCA Security Model
In the following, we define the IND-CCA security notions for TC-CP-ABE systems.
Definition 11 A TC-CP-ABE scheme with is selectively IND-CCA secure if no PPT adversary A can win the
game below with non-negligible advantage. In the game, B is the game challenger, k and U are the security
parameter and the attribute universe.
Init. The adversary outputs a challenge access structure (M∗,ρ∗) to the challenger.
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters PK to the adversary.
Phase 1. The adversary is given access to the following oracles:
1) Private key extraction oracle Osk(S): on input an attribute set S, the challenger runs SKS←KeyGen(MSK,S).
2) Ciphertext decryption oracle Od(S,CT(M,ρ),TK): on input an attribute set S, a ciphertext CT(M,ρ) and a
token TK, the challenger returns M←Decrypt(S,SKS ,CT(M,ρ),TK) to the adversary, where SKS ←
KeyGen(MSK,S), TK←TokGen(k) and S satisfies (M,ρ) for S defined as the intersection set between
S and the attribute set from Encrypt algorithm.
3) Set intersection oracle Osi(S,S′,CT(M,ρ)): on input an attribute sets S (defining the access structure
(M,ρ) during the encryption), an attribute set S′ and a ciphertext CT(M,ρ)←Encrypt(S,(M,ρ),M,TK),
the challenger returns the intersection set S = S∩S′ to the adversary, where TK←TokGen(k).
Note that if the ciphertexts queries to oracle Od are invalid, then the challenger simply outputs ⊥. In this
phase, it is forbidden to issue the following query: Osk(S) for any S satisfying (M∗,ρ∗).
Challenge. The adversary submits two equal length messages M0 and M1. The challenger flips a random
coin b and encrypts Mb under (M∗,ρ∗). The ciphertext CT ∗(M∗,ρ∗) is given to the adversary.
Phase 2. Phase 1 is repeated except for the following:
1) Osk(S) for any S satisfying (M∗,ρ∗),
2) Od(S,CT ∗(M∗,ρ∗)) for any S satisfying (M
∗,ρ∗) where S is defined as the intersection set between S and
the attributes set from Encrypt algorithm.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0,1}. If b′ = b then the adversary wins.
The advantage of A is defined as ε1 =AdvIND−CCATC−CP−ABE,A(k,U) = |Pr[b′ = b]−1/2|.
C. Security Model against malicious adversaries
In the following, we define the security notions against malicious adversaries for TC-CP-ABE systems.
Definition 12 A TC-CP-ABE scheme with is selectively secure against malicious adversaries if no PPT
adversary A can win the game below with non-negligible advantage. In the game, B is the game challenger, k
and U are the security parameter and the attribute universe.
Init. The adversary outputs a challenge access structure (M∗,ρ∗) to the challenger.
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters PK to the adversary.
Phase 1. The adversary is given access to the following oracle:
Embedded-token encryption oracle Oet(M,TK): on input a messageM and a token TK, the challenger returns
CT(M,ρ)←Encrypt(S,(M,ρ),M,TK) to the adversary where S satisfies (M,ρ) and TK←TokGen(k).
Challenge. The adversary submits two equal length messages M0 and M1. The challenger flips a random
coin b and encrypts Mb under (M∗,ρ∗). The ciphertext CT ∗(M∗,ρ∗) is given to the adversary.
Phase 2. Phase 1 is repeated.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0,1}. If b′ = b then the adversary wins.
The advantage of A is defined as ε2 =AdvSHTC−CP−ABE,A(k,U) = |Pr[b′ = b]−1/2|.
D. Security Model against collusion attacks
As in previous ABE schemes, one of the main challenges in designing our scheme is to prevent against attacks
from colluding users.
The receiver owns a private key which is associated with a attribute set S. He can decrypt a ciphertext if
and only if the access matrix associated with the ciphertext is satisfied by his credentials (or attributes). In
order to avoid collusions, each key is randomized with a freshly chosen exponent t. During the Decryption, each
share is multiplied by t in the exponent. This factor should bind the components of one receiver’s key together,
therefore we are not be able to combine them with another receiver’s key components. Thus, these randomized
shares are only useful for one particular key.
In addition, other collusion attacks could occur when constructing the intersection set of attributes S:
several receivers could combine their sets in order to find enough elements to determine S (suppose that some
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grandchildren try to decrypt the message of their grandparent). In order to avoid such attacks, a receiver’s
private key receives extra random pieces of information useful to construct S during decryption, using another
freshly chosen exponent t̃. Intuitively, these pieces should enable one to recover the coefficients of the polynomials
constructed from the sender’s attributes set and to test whether the elements of a receiver’s attributes set are
roots of these polynomials.
IV. Our Construction
A. Description
In this section, we present a construction of TC-CP-ABE scheme in the random oracle model with selectively
IND-CCA security, security against malicious adversaries and collusion resistance. Inspired by Waters ABE
[23], we first construct a selectively IND-CCA secure and collusion resistant ABE scheme in the random oracle
model. The main idea is to realize expressive functionality and to prove security under the concrete and non-
interactive Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption. As in the Waters construction,
the encryption algorithm takes as input a LSSS access matrix M and distributes a random exponent s ∈ Zp
according to M . Private keys are generated by a central trusted party and randomized to avoid collusion attack.
Afterwards, we extend it to achieve a TC-CP-ABE scheme with the desired level of security. We define our
scheme such that the receiver owns a dataset and wishes to perform a set intersection operation with the sender’s
dataset without learning any extra information other than the output of the operation. This latter requirement
is based on the difficulty of the Discrete Logarithm problem. Moreover, in order to enhance the security, the
message is encrypted by using the public paramaters together with a secret token, randomly generated by a
untrusted party, in such a way that the receiver is not able to decrypt the ciphertextuntil the token is released
by this party.
B. Our TC-CP-ABE Scheme
We let U be the attribute universe in the system and S be an attribute set such that S ⊆ U and |S| = 2U
where U is a large number (the cardinality is assumed to be public).
• Setup(k,U). Given a security parameter k and U , run (p,g,G,GT ,e)← BSetup(k). Choose 2 random
values α,a∈R Z∗p, a random generator g1 ∈R G and compute h= ga; choose U random values q1, · · · , qU ∈R
Z∗p, and compute Q1 = gq1 , · · · ,QU = gqU ; and set the following TCR hash functions H1 : {0,1}2k →
Z∗p,H2 : GT ×G→ {0,1}2k,H3 : {0,1}∗ → G,H4 : {0,1}∗ → G,H5 : GT → G. The public parameters are
PK = (p,g,G,GT , e,g1,h,e(g,g)α,Q1, · · · ,QU ,H1, H2,H3,H4,H5) and the master secret key is MSK =
(gα, q1, · · · , qU ).
• TokGen(k). Given a security paramter k, choose a random token TK←TokGen(k).
• KeyGen(MSK,S). Given MSK and an attribute set S, choose t, t̃ ∈R Z∗p, and set the private key SKS
as SKS = (K = gαht,L= gt,∀x ∈ S Kx =H3(x)t, Q̄= gt̃, Q̄1 = g−q1ht̃, · · · , Q̄U = g−qUht̃).
• Encrypt(S,(M,ρ),M,TK). Taking an LSSS access structure (M,ρ) (M is an l×n matrix and the function
ρ associates rows of M to attributes), an attribute set S satisfying (M,ρ), and a message M∈ {0,1}k as
input, the encryption algorithm works as follows.
1) From the attribute set S = {(x1,1,x1,2) · · · ,(xU,1,xU,2)},
– pick at random Nj,0 and Nj,1,Nj,2 in Z∗p for j ∈ [U ] (for i= 1,2, the Nj,i are supposed not to be
equal each other, and they are not equal to xj,1,xj,2),
– for j ∈ [U ], construct the polynomials Pj(x) =Nj,0(x−xj,1)(x−xj,2)(x−Nj,1)(x−Nj,2) =
∑4
i=0 νj,ix
i,
– then, for j ∈ [U ], i ∈ {0, · · · ,4}, compute gj,i = gνj,iQj = gνj,i+qj and Xj,i =H5(e(gνj,i ,g))⊕gνj,i .
2) Then,
– choose β ∈R {0,1}k, set s = H1(M ‖ β) and a random vector ~v = (s,y2, · · · ,yn) ∈R Znp , where
y2, · · · ,yn ∈R Z∗p,
– for i= [l], set λi = v ·Mi, where Mi is the vector corresponding to the i-th row of M ,
– choose r1, · · · , rl ∈R Z∗p, set A1 = (M‖β)⊕H2(e(g,g)αs,TK),A2 = gs,A3 = gs1,(B1 =hλ1H3(ρ(1))−r1 ,C1 =
gr1), · · · ,(Bl = hλlH3(ρ(l))−rl ,C1 = grl),D=H4(A1,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),(M,ρ))s, and output
the original ciphertext CT(M,ρ) = ((M,ρ),A1,A2,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),D,(g1,0,X1,0),(g1,1,X1,1),
(g1,2,X1,2),(g1,3,X1,3),(g1,4,X1,4), · · · ,(gU,0,XU,0),(gU,1,XU,1),(gU,2,XU,2),(gU,3,XU,3),(gU,4,XU,4)).
Note that {ρ(i) : 1≤ i≤ l} are the attributes used in the access structure (M,ρ).
• Decrypt(CT(M,ρ),S,SKS ,TK). Parse the original ciphertext CT(M,ρ) as ((M,ρ),A1,A2,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,
(Bl,Cl),D,(g1,0,X1,0), · · · ,(gU,4,XU,4)), and the private key SKS (for an attribute set S) as (K,L,∀x ∈
S Kx, Q̄, Q̄1, · · · , Q̄U ). We let S′ be the attribute set used in the Encrypt algorithm.
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1) Start by setting the intersection set S = S∩S′.
– If |S|> 2U then output ⊥; otherwise proceed.
– For j ∈ [U ] and i∈ {0, · · · ,4}, compute gj,iQ̄j = gνj,i+qjg−qjht̃ = gνj,iht̃, and then Y = e(g
νj,iht̃,g)
e(Q̄,h) =
e(gνj,igat̃,g)
e(gt̃,ga)
= e(gνj,i ,g). Finally, for j ∈ [U ] and i∈{0, · · · ,4}, outputH5(Y )⊕Xj,i =H5(e(gνj,i ,g))⊕
H5(e(gνj,i ,g))⊕gνj,i = gνj,i .
– For j ∈ [U ], construct gPj(x) = gνj,0 · (gνj,1)x · (gνj,2)x2 · (gνj,3)x3 · (gνj,4)x4 .
– For j ∈ [U ], for a pair (x̂j,1, x̂j,2) in S, compute
∗ gPj(x̂j,1): if gPj(x̂j,1) = 1 then x̂j,1 ∈ S′ and stop; otherwise x̂j,1 /∈ S′ and proceed,
∗ gPj(x̂j,2): if gPj(x̂j,2) = 1 then x̂j,2 ∈ S′ and stop; otherwise x̂j,2 /∈ S′ and output ⊥.
– Keep going this process for all j ∈ [U ] and learn S = S′ ∩S. If S satisfies (M,ρ) and |S| ≥ U s.t
∀j ∈ [U ],(x̂j,1 ∈ S∨ x̂j,2 ∈ S), then proceed; otherwise output ⊥.
2) We recall that I = {i : ρ(i)∈ S}⊂ [l] and let {wi ∈Z∗p}i∈I be the set of constants such that
∑
i∈I wiλi =
s.
– Verify the validity of the ciphertext
e(A2,g1)
?= e(g,A3)e(A3,H4(A1,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),(M,ρ)))
?= e(g1,D)
S satisfies (M,ρ) ?
e(
∏
i∈I
Bwii ,g)
?= e(A2,gα)
∏
i∈I
e(C−1i ,H3(ρ(i))
wi) (1)
If Eq. (1) does not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed with the next step.
– Compute Z = e(A2,K)/
∏
i∈I(e(Bi,L) ·e(Ci,Kρ(i)))wi and M‖ β =H2(Z,TK)⊕A1. Ouput M if
A3 = gH1(M‖β)1 , and output ⊥ otherwise.
Correctness: In order to check the correctness of the intersection set, let S be the set of attributes used
in the Encrypt algorithm and S′ be the set of attributes used in the KeyGen algorithm. For j ∈ [U ], for a
pair (x̂j,1, x̂j,2) ∈ S′, if gPj(x̂j,i) = 1 where i= 1,2, then Pj(x̂j,i) = 0 which means that x̂j,i is a root of Pj and
x̂j,i = xj,i′ where i′ = 1,2, xj,i ∈ S: we conclude that x̂j,i ∈ S. Reciprocally, if x̂j,i ∈ S, then x̂j,i = xj,i′ and
Pj(x̂j,i) = 0: we conclude that gPj(x̂j,i) = 1.
Once we retrieve the intersection set S = S∩S′, we define I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S} ⊂ [l] and {wi ∈ Z∗p}i∈I as the set
of constants such that
∑
i∈I wiλi = s. We check the validity of the value Z.
Z = e(A2,K)∏
i∈I
(e(Bi,L) ·e(Ci,Kρ(i)))wi
= e(g
s,gαht)∏
i∈I
(e(hλiH3(ρ(i))−ri ,gt) · (gri ,H3(ρ(i))t)wi
= e(g
s,gαgat)
e(g,gat)
∑
i∈I λiwi
= e(gs,gα)
hence H2(Z,TK)⊕A1 =H2(e(gs,gα),TK)⊕ (M‖ β)⊕H2(e(gs,gα),TK) =M‖ β.
C. IND-CCA Security Proof
We start this section by giving an overview of the formal security analysis1. Let CT ∗(M∗,ρ∗) = ((M
∗,ρ∗),A∗1,A∗2,A∗3,
(B∗1 ,C∗1 ), · · · ,(B∗l∗ ,C∗l∗),D∗,(g∗1,0,X∗1,0), · · · ,(g∗U,4,X∗U,4)) be the challenge ciphertext ofMb. Let A be an adver-
sary that follows the constraints defined in the previous section. A will use the Ciphertext decryption oracle Od
in order to try to get a special advantage in guessing the value of the bit b. Roughly speaking, Amight modify the
challenge ciphertext, and submit the resulting ciphertext to Od. Since A∗1,A∗3,(B∗1 ,C∗1 ), · · · ,(B∗l∗ ,C∗l∗) are bound
by D∗ as well as the description of (M∗,ρ∗), such a change is noticeable with non-negligible probability from Eq.
(1). Indeed, we can view D∗ as a signature for such components. In addition, the integrity of A∗2 is bound by A∗3.
If the ciphertext is changed, then Eq. (1) will not hold. Therefore, no special advantage in guessing b leaks to A.
Theorem 1 Suppose the Decisional q-Parallel BDHE assumption holds in (G,GT ) and H1,H2, H3 and H4
are TCR hash functions, our TC-CP-ABE scheme is selectively IND-CCA secure in the random oracle model.
Suppose there is an adversary A who can break the IND-CCA security of our scheme. We then construct a
reduction algorithm B to decide whether T is either equal to e(g,g)aq+1s or to a random element in GT . The
simulator B plays the IND-CCA game with A as follows.
B takes in (p,g,G,GT ,e)← BSetup(k) and a q-parallel BDHE instance ~y,T , where T is either equal to
e(g,g)aq+1s or to a random element in GT .
1Our security analysis is inspired by [17].
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Init. The adversary gives the challenge access structure (M∗,ρ∗) to B, where M∗ has l∗ rows and n∗ columns
such that l∗,n∗ ≤ q.
Setup. The simulator chooses at random α′,γ ∈R Zp and implicitly sets g1 = gγ and α= α′+aq+1 by letting
e(g,g)α = e(ga,gaq )e(g,g)α′ (it can be seen that α= α′+aq+1, which cannot be computed by B).
Then the simulator chooses the TCR hash functions and the exponents q1, · · · , qU as in the real scheme, and
sends the public parameters PK = (p,g,G,GT ,e,g1,h= ga,e(g,g)α,Q1 = gq1 , · · · ,QU = gqU ,H1,H2,H3,H4,H5)
to A. We note that the public parameters are identical to those in the real scheme for the adversary. At any
time, A can adaptively query the random oracles Hj for j ∈ [5], which are controlled by B. The simulator
maintains the lists HListj for j ∈ [5], which are initially empty, and answers the queries to the random oracles
as follows.
• H1: on receipt of an H1 query on (M,β), if there is a tuple (M,β,s) ∈HList1 , B forwards the predefined
value s to A, where s ∈ Z∗p. Otherwise, B sets H1(M,β) = s, responds s to A and adds the tuple (M,β,s)
to HList1 where s ∈R Z∗p.
• H2: on receipt of an H2 query on R1 ∈GT ,R2 ∈G, if there is a tuple (R1,R2, δ1) ∈HList2 , B forwards the
predefined value δ1 to A where δ1 ∈ {0,1}2k. Otherwise, B sets H2(R1,R2) = δ1, responds δ1 to A and
adds the tuple (R1,R2, δ1) to HList2 where δ1 ∈R {0,1}2k.
• H3: on receipt of an H3 query on x ∈ U , if there is a tuple (x,zx, δ2,x) ∈HList3 , B forwards the predefined
value δ2,x to A where zx ∈ Z∗p, δ2,x ∈ G. Otherwise, B constructs δ2,x as follows. Let X denote the set of
indices i such that ρ∗(i) = x where 1≤ i≤ l∗. Namely, X contains the indices of rows of matrix M∗ that
corresponds to the same attribute x. B chooses zx ∈R Z∗p and sets
δ2,x = gzx
∏
i∈X
g
aM∗i,1/bi+a
2M∗i,2/bi+···+a
n∗M∗i,n∗/bi .
If X = ∅, B sets δ2,x = gzx . B responds δ2,x to A and adds the tuple (x,zx, δ2,x) to HList3 .
• H4: on receipt of anH4 query on (A1,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),(M,ρ)), if there is a tuple (A1,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,
(Bl,Cl),(M,ρ), ξ1, δ3) ∈HList4 , B forwards the predefined value δ3 to A where ξ1 ∈ Z∗p, δ3 ∈G. Otherwise,
B sets δ3 = gξ1 , responds δ3 to A and adds the tuple (A1,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),(M,ρ), ξ1, δ3) in HList4
where ξ1 ∈R Z∗p.
• H5: on receipt of an H5 query on δ ∈ GT , if there is a tuple (δ,ξ2) in HList5 , B forwards the predefined
value ξ2 to A, where ξ2 ∈G. Otherwise, B sets H5(δ) = ξ2 to A and adds the tuple (δ,ξ2) to HList5 , where
ξ2 ∈R G.
In addition, B maintains the list SKList which is initially empty as follows: SKList records the tuples (S,SKS)
which are the results of the queries to Osk(S).
Phase 1. The simulator answers to A’s queries as follows.
• Private key extraction oracle Osk(S):
SKS is constructed for an attribute set S as follows. We suppose that we give a private key for a set S to
B, where S does not satisfy M∗ (if S satisfies M∗ then the simulator outputs a random bit in {0,1} and
aborts the simulation).
First, r ∈R Zp is randomly chosen. Then B finds a vector ~w = (w1, · · · ,wn∗) ∈ Zn
∗
p such that w1 =−1 and
for all i where ρ∗(i) ∈ S, we have that ~w ·M∗i = 0. By the definition of a LSSS we gave in the previous
section, such a vector must exist. We note that if such a vector did not exist, then the vector (1,0, · · · ,0)
would be in the span of S.
Second, B defines implicitly t as r+w1aq+w2aq−1 +· · ·+wn∗aq−n
∗+1, by setting L= gr
∏
i=1,··· ,n∗
(gaq+1−i)wi =
gt. By definition of t, ht = gat contains a term of g−aq+1 . This term will cancel out with the unknown term
in gα when K is computed. Thus, B creates K as
K = gα
′
gar
∏
i=2,··· ,n∗
(ga
q+2−i
)wi = gα
′
ga
q+1
g−a
q+1 ∏
i=2,··· ,n∗
(ga
q+2−i
)wi
= gα(gr
∏
i=1,··· ,n∗
(ga
q+2−i
)wi)a = gαLa = gαgat = gαht.
Third, the simulator calculates Kx ∀x∈ S. Let x∈ S for which there is no i such that ρ∗(i) = x, we compute
Kx = Lzx . Therefore, we obtain that Kx = Lzx = δt2,x =H3(x)t.
Nevertheless, it remains more difficult to compute key components Kx for attributes x ∈ S for which there
is one i such that ρ∗(i) = x (x is used in the access structure). We need to check that there are no terms
of the form gaq+1/bi that cannot be simulated; if we have M∗i · ~w = 0, then all of these terms cancel.
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We define X as X = {i,ρ∗(i) = x}. Thus, for this case, B creates Kx as follows:
Kx = Lzx
∏
i∈X
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
g ajbi r ∏
k=1,··· ,n∗;k 6=j
(ga
q+1+j−k/bi)wk
M
∗
i,j
= Lzx
∏
i∈X
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
g ajbi r ∏
k=1,··· ,n∗;k 6=j
(ga
q+1+j−k/bi)wk
M
∗
i,j ∏
i∈X
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
(
g(a
q+1/bi)
)wjM∗i,j
=
gr ∏
i=1,··· ,n∗
g(a
q+1−iwi)
zx ∏
i∈X
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
g ajbi r ∏
k=1,··· ,n∗
(ga
q+1+j−k/bi)wk
M
∗
i,j
=
(
gr
∏
i∈X
g
a
M∗
i,1
bi
+a2
M∗
i,2
bi
+···+an
∗ M∗i,n∗
bi
)κ
such that κ= (r+
n∗∑
i=1
wia
q−i+1)
= δ(r+w1a
q+···+wn∗a
q−n∗+1)
2,x = δ
t
2,x =H3(x)t.
We recall that if S is not an authorized set for (M∗,ρ∗), then w ·M∗i = 0.
Thus, we have
∏
i∈X
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
(gaq+1/bi)wjM
∗
i,j = g
aq+1(
∑
i∈X
∑
j=1,··· ,n∗
wjM
∗
i,j/bi)
= g0 = 1.
In addition, the simulator chooses t̃∈R Z∗p, and constructs Q̄ and Q̄1, · · · , Q̄U as in the real scheme. Finally,
B adds the tuple (S,SKS) to SKList and returns SKS to the adversary.
• Ciphertext decryption oracle Od(S,CT(M,ρ),TK):
The simulator checks whether Eq. (1) holds. If not, then either the ciphertext is invalid or S = S∩S′ does
not satisfy (M,ρ) (where S′ is the attributes set used to define (M,ρ) in the Encrypt algorithm), and B
outputs ⊥. Otherwise, B proceeds.
– If (S,SKS) ∈ SKList for any S such that S = S∩S′ satisfying (M,ρ), the simulator recovers M as in
the real scheme using SKS .
– Otherwise, B verifies whether (M,β,s)∈HList1 and (R1,R2, δ1)∈HList2 such that A3 = gs1, A1 = (M‖
β)⊕δ1, R1 = e(g,g)αs and R2 = TK. The simulator outputs ⊥ if no such tuples exist and outputs M
otherwise.
• Set intersection oracle Osi(S,S′,CT(M,ρ)):
The simulator parses the ciphertext as ((M,ρ),A1,A2,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),D,(g1,0,X1,0), · · · , (gU,4,
XU,4)).
– If S does not satisfy (M,ρ) then the simulator outputs ⊥ (where S is the attribute set used to define
(M,ρ) in the Encrypt algorithm).
– Otherwise, the simulator constructs S as in the real scheme. If S = S∩S′ does not satisfy (M,ρ) then
the simulator outputs ⊥. If |S| ≥ U then the simulator outputs S.
Challenge. The challenge ciphertext is constructed as follows. The adversary gives two messages M0 and
M1 to the simulator. The simulator flips a coin b. For each row i of M∗, B sets x∗ = ρ∗(i) and issues an H3
query on x∗ to obtain the tuple (x∗,zx∗ , δ2,x∗).
We carefully focus on the simulation of the Bi values since the terms which must be canceled out are contained
in. Nevertheless, B can choose the secret splitting in order to cancel out these terms. In other words, B chooses
at random y′2, · · · ,y′n∗ and shares the secret using the vector ~v = (s,sa+y′2, · · · ,san−1 +y′n∗) ∈ Zn
∗
p . Moreover,
values r′1, · · · , r′l are randomly chosen.
For i= 1, · · · ,n∗, let Ri be Ri = {k 6= i,ρ∗(k) = ρ∗(i)}. Intuitively, Ri is the set of all other row indices that
have the same attribute as row i. Therefore, we generate the components of the challenge ciphertext as follows:
Bi = δ
−r′i
2,x∗ · (
∏
j=2,··· ,n∗
hM
∗
i,jy
′
j ) ·gsbi·(−zx∗ ) ·
 ∏
k∈Ri
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
(ga
js(bi/bk))M
∗
k,j
−1 ,Ci = gr′igsbi .
Then, B chooses β∗ ∈R {0,1}k,TK∗ ∈R G∗,A∗1 ∈R {0,1}2k and implicitly sets H2(T · e(gs,gα
′),TK∗) = A∗1⊕
(Mb ‖ β∗), and finally computes A∗2 = gs and A∗3 = (gs)γ .
The simulator issues anH4 query on A∗1,A∗3,(B∗1 ,C∗1 ), · · · ,(B∗l∗ ,C∗l∗),(M∗,ρ∗) to obtain (A∗1,A∗3,(B∗1 ,C∗1 ), · · · ,(B∗l∗ ,C∗l∗),
(M∗,ρ∗), ξ∗1 , δ∗3) , and sets D∗ = (gs)ξ
∗
1 .
Moreover, the simulator computes the values g∗j,i as follows. From the attribute set S∗= {(x∗1,1,x∗1,2), · · · ,(x∗U,1,x∗U,2)},
1) pick at random N∗j,0 and N∗j,1,N∗j,2 in Z∗p, for j ∈ [U ],
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2) for j ∈ [U ], construct the polynomials P ∗j (x) =N∗j,0(x−x∗j,1)(x−x∗j,2)(x−N∗j,1)(x−N∗j,2) =
∑4
i=0 ν
∗
j,ix
i,
3) then, for j ∈ [U ], i ∈ {0, · · · ,4}, compute g∗j,i = g
ν∗j,iQj and issues an H5 query on δ∗ = e(gν
∗
j,i ,g) to obtain
(δ∗, ξ∗2) and defines X∗j,i = ξ∗2 ⊕g
ν∗j,i .
Finally, the simulator outputs the challenge ciphertext CT ∗(M∗,ρ∗) = ((M
∗,ρ∗),A∗1,A∗2,A∗3, (B∗1 ,C∗1 ), · · · ,(B∗l∗ ,C∗l∗),
D∗,(g∗1,0,X∗1,0), · · · ,(g∗U,4,X∗U,4)) to the adversary.
If T = e(g,g)aq+1s, CT ∗(M∗,ρ∗) is a valid ciphertext. By letting H1(Mb,β
∗) = s and ri = r′i+sbi, we can check:
A∗1 = A∗1⊕ (Mb ‖ β∗)⊕ (Mb ‖ β∗) =H2(Te(gs,gα
′
),TK∗)⊕ (Mb ‖ β∗) =H2(e(g,g)αs,TK∗)⊕ (Mb ‖ β∗),
A∗2 = gs,A∗3 = gsγ = gs1,D∗ = (gs)ξ
∗
1 =H4(A∗1,A∗3,(B∗1 ,C∗1 ), · · · ,(B∗l∗ ,C∗l∗),(M∗,ρ∗))s,
B∗i = δ
−r′i
2,x∗(
∏
j=2,··· ,n∗
hM
∗
i,jy
′
j ) ·g−z
∗
xsbi · (
∏
k∈Ri
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
ga
js(bi/bk)M∗k,j )−1
= δ−r
′
i
2,x∗(
∏
j=2,··· ,n∗
gaM
∗
i,jy
′
j )(
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
ga
jsM∗i,j )(
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
ga
jsM∗i,j )−1g−z
∗
xsbi)(
∏
k∈Ri
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
ga
js(bi/bk)M∗k,j )−1
= δ−r
′
i
2,x∗g
aλi(
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
ga
jsM∗i,j )−1 ·g−z
∗
xsbi · (
∏
k∈Ri
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
ga
js(bi/bk)M∗k,j )−1
= gaλig−r
′
iz
∗
xg−z
∗
xsbi(
∏
i∈X
g
aM∗i,1/bi+a
2M∗i,2/bi+···+a
n∗M∗i,n∗/bi)−r
′
i(
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
ga
jsM∗i,j )−1
(
∏
k∈Ri
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
ga
js(bi/bk)M∗k,j )−1
= gaδiδ−r
′
i−sbi
2,x∗ = g
aδiδ−ri2,x∗ = g
aδiH3(x∗)−ri = gaδiH3(ρ∗(i))−ri = hδiH3(ρ∗(i))−ri ,
C∗i = gr
′
i+sbi = gri .
Nevertheless, if T ∈GT , then the challenge ciphertext is independent of the bit b for A.
Phase 2. Same as in Phase 1 but with the constraints defined in the Security Model Section on page 7.
Guess. The adversary will eventually output a guess b′ of b. The simulator then outputs 0 to guess that
T = e(g,g)aq+1s if b = b′; otherwise, it outputs 1 to indicate that it believes T is a random group element in
GT .
Analysis of the simulations of the Random Oracles: The simulations of the random oracles are perfect except
H1 and H2. Let H∗1 and H∗2 be the events that A has queried before the Challenge phase (Mb,β∗) to H1
(probability of successful query as AdvTCRH∗1 ,A) and (R
∗
1,R
∗
2) = (e(g,g)αs,TK) to H2 (probability of successful
query as AdvTCRH∗2 ,A).In the simulation of Osk, the responses to A are perfect.
In the simulation of Od, it might be possible that the simulator cannot provide a decryption for a valid
ciphertext. Suppose the adversary can generate a valid ciphertext without querying e(g,g)αs to H2, where
s = H1(M,β). Let V alid be the event that the ciphertext is valid, QueryH1 be the event that the adversary
has queried (M,β) to H1, and QueryH2 be the event that the adversary has queried (e(g,g)αs,TK) to H2.
From the simulation, Pr[V alid | ¬QueryH2]≤ Pr[QueryH1 |QueryH2]+Pr[V alid |QueryH1∧¬QueryH2]≤
qH1/22k+1/p and Pr[V alid | ¬QueryH1]≤ qH2/22k+1/p, where qH1 , qH2 are the maximum numbers of random
oracle queries to H1,H2. Let Pr[DecErr] be the probability that the event V alid | (¬QueryH1∨¬QueryH2)
occurs, then Pr[DecErr]≤ ( qH1+qH222k +
2
p )qd, where qd is the total number of ciphertext decryption queries.
Let Bad denote the event that (H∗1 | ¬H∗2 )∨H∗2 ∨DecErr, then
ε1 =|Pr[b′= b]−1/2 |≤
1
2Pr[Bad] =
1
2Pr[(H
∗
1 | ¬H∗2 )∨H∗2 ∨DecErr]≤
1
2(Adv
TCR
H∗2 ,A
+ 2qd
p
+ qH1 + (qH1 + qH2)qd
22k
)
Therefore, AdvD−q−PBDHEA ≥
1
qH2
AdvTCRH∗2 ,A
≥ 1qH2 (2ε1−
qH1+(qH1+qH2 )qd
22k −
2qd
p ).
D. Security Proof against malicious adversaries
We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Our TC-CP-ABE scheme is secure against malicious adversaries in the random oracle model.
Suppose there is a malicious adversary A who can break the security of our scheme. We then let B be the
simulator playing the game with A as follows:
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B takes in (p,g,G,GT ,e)←BSetup(k).
Init. The adversary gives the challenge access structure (M∗,ρ∗) to the simulator, where M∗ has l∗ rows
and n∗ columns such that l∗,n∗ ≤ q.
Setup. The simulator chooses at random α,a∈R Zp and g1 ∈G, and sets g = ha. Then the simulator chooses
the TCR hash functions and the exponents q1, · · · , qU as in the real scheme, and sends the public parameters
PK = (p,g,G,GT ,e,g1,h= ga,e(g,g)α,Q1 = gq1 , · · · ,QU = gqU ,H1,H2,H3,H4,H5) to the adversary. The public
parameters are identical to those in the real scheme for A. At any time, A can adaptively query the random
oracles Hj for j ∈ [5], which are controlled by B. The simulator maintains the lists HListj for j ∈ [5], which are
initially empty and answers the queries to the random oracles as explained previously.
Phase 1. The simulator answers to A’s queries as follows:
Embedded-token encryption oracle Oet(M,TK):
The ciphertext CT(M,ρ) is indistinguishable even with the secret key SKS as long as the token TK is unknown.
The intuitive meaning of this oracle is to ensure that CT(M,ρ) would not leak any information about TK that
is useful for distinguishing the ciphertexts.
The simulator constructs CT(M,ρ) as follows:
• B verifies whether (R1,R2, δ1) ∈HList2 such that R1 = e(g,g)α and R2 = TK. if such tuples exist then the
simulator constructs CT(M,ρ) as in the real scheme.
• Otherwise, the simulator chooses TK ∈R G and β ∈R {0,1}k, sets s = H1(M ‖ β) and a random vector
~v = (s,y2, · · · ,yn) ∈R Znp , where y2, · · · ,yn ∈R Z∗p, then, for i = 1, · · · , l, sets λi = v ·Mi, where Mi is
the vector corresponding to the i-th row of M , and finally, chooses r1, · · · , rl ∈R Z∗p, sets A1 = (M ‖
β)⊕H2(e(g,g)αs,TK),A2 = gs,A3 = gs1,(B1 = hλ1H3(ρ(1))−r1 ,C1 = gr1), · · · ,(Bl = hλlH3(ρ(l))−rl ,C1 =
grl),D=H4(A1,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),(M,ρ))s, outputs the ciphertext CT(M,ρ) = ((M,ρ),A1,A2,A3,(B1,C1),
· · · ,(Bl,Cl),D,(g1,0,X1,0), · · · ,(gU,4,XU,4)) where (g1,0,X1,0), · · · ,(gU,4,XU,4) are constructed as in the real
scheme.
Finally, the simulator returns CT(M,ρ) to the adversary.
Challenge. We build the challenge ciphertext. The adversary gives two messages M0 and M1 to the
simulator. The simulator flips a coin b. As in the real scheme, B constructs and outputs the challenge ciphertext
CT ∗(M∗,ρ∗) = ((M
∗,ρ∗),A∗1,A∗2,A∗3,(B∗1 ,C∗1 ), · · · , (B∗l∗ ,C∗l∗),D∗,(g∗1,0,X∗1,0), · · · ,(g∗U,4,X∗U,4)) to the adversary.
Phase 2. Same as in Phase 1.
Guess. The adversary will eventually output a guess b′ of b. The simulator then outputs 0 if b= b′; otherwise,
it outputs 1.
Analysis of the simulations of the Random Oracles: The simulations of the random oracles are perfect except
H2 in Ote. Let us consider the challenge ciphertext CT(M∗,ρ∗) that the adversary gets from the challenger. We
parse CT(M∗,ρ∗) as CT ∗(M∗,ρ∗) = ((M
∗,ρ∗),A∗1,A∗2,A∗3,(B∗1 ,C∗1 ), · · · ,(B∗l∗ ,C∗l∗),D∗,(g∗1,0,X∗1,0), · · · ,(g∗U,4,X∗U,4))
where A∗1 = (M‖ β)⊕H2(e(g,g)αs,TK∗).
Let us denote by QueryH2 the event that the adversary queries H2 at the point (R∗1,R∗2) = (e(g,g)αs,TK∗).
Since H2 is modeled as a random oracle, the value b is independent from the adversary’s view as long as QueryH2
does not hold. Therefore, Pr[b= b′] =Pr[b= b′∧QueryH2]+Pr[b= b′∧¬QueryH2] =Pr[b= b′|QueryH2]Pr[QueryH2]+
1
2Pr[¬QueryH2]. Due to the fact that the adversary is in possession of the secret key SKS for the attribute set S,
it can recover the value R∗1 = e(g,g)αs from CT ∗(M∗,ρ∗). If QueryH2 holds, the adversary can computeMb from
CT ∗(M∗,ρ∗) and it can check if CT
∗
(M∗,ρ∗) = ((M
∗,ρ∗),A∗1,A∗2,A∗3,(B∗1 ,C∗1 ), · · · , (B∗l∗ ,C∗l∗),D∗,(g∗1,0,X∗1,0), · · · ,(g∗U,4,X∗U,4)).
Therefore, Pr[b= b′|QueryH2] = 1, and Pr[b= b′] = 12 +
1
2Pr[QueryH2].
Finally, it lacks to compute an upper bound for Pr[QueryH2]. Note that the adversary has two ways of
evaluating H2 at (R1,R∗2):
• by directly querying H2 at (R1,R∗2),
• by querying Oet on the message M and the token TK∗: it can recover e(g,g)αs using the secret key SKS
and it computes H2(R1,R∗2)⊕A1 =M‖ β.
It follows that Pr[QueryH2]≤
qH2+qet
22k , where qH2 and qet are the maximum number of random oracles queries
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to H2 and the total number of embedded-token encryption queries respectively. Finally, ε2 = |2Pr[b= b′]−1| ≤
qH2+qet
22k .
E. Efficiency
From the simulation, the running time of the challenger is bound by
t′ ≤ t+O(1)(qH1 + qH2 + qH3 + qH4 + qH5 + qsk+ qet+ qd+ qsi) + te(qskO(n
2) + qdO(l)
+qH1(qd+ qet)O(1) + qsiO(U)) + tp((qre+ qd)O(l))
where qHi denotes the maximum number of random oracle queries to Hi (i ∈ [5]), qsk denote the total numbers
of private key extraction queries, qd denote the total number of ciphertext decryption queries, qet denote the
total number of embedded-token encryption queries, qsi denote the total number of set intersection queries,
te denotes the running time of an exponentiation in G, tp denotes the running time of a pairing GT , t is the
running time of A, l is the number of rows of M , and 2U is the number of attributes in the sets used in the
scheme.
V. Conclusion
We introduced a solution to encrypt data using the DNA sequences of the sender and to decrypt data using
the DNA sequences of the receiver. Focusing on the principle of the DNA parentage test, we provided a new
scheme called Token-Controlled Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (TC-CP-ABE). Based on Waters
ABE scheme, we extended it adding two extra features to allow decryption of the ciphertext, namely set of
intersection operation and generation of a token released at the appointed time. We proved that our scheme is
selectively IND-CCA secure, secure against malicious adversaries and collusion resistant in the random oracle
model, under the Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption. As for the future work, it
would be interesting to consider the selectively/adaptively IND-CCA security in the standard model and/or
under weaker (Decisional) Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (Exponent) assumptions.
Acknowledgements
This work is partially supported by ARC Linkage Project LP12020052. W. Susilo is supported by ARC Future
Fellowship FT0991397 and ARC Discovery Project DP130101383.
References
[1] J. Baek, R. Safavi-Naini and W. Susilo, Token-Controlled Public-Key Encryption. In ISPEC 2005, LCNS 3439, pages 386-397,
2005.
[2] A. Beimel, Secure Schemes for Secret Sharing and Key Distribution. In PhD Thesis, Israel Institute of Technology, 1996.
[3] J. Bethencourt, A. Sahai and B. Waters, Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption. In IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, pages 321-334 2007.
[4] D. Boneh and X. Boyen, Efficient selective-ID Secure Identity-Based Encryption without Random Oracles. In EUROCRYPT,
pages 223-238, 2004.
[5] D. Boneh and X. Boyen, Secure Identity-Based Encryption without Random Oracles. In CRYPTO, pages 443-459, 2004.
[6] D. Boneh and M. K. Franklin, Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing. SIAM J. Comput. 32(3): 586-615, 2003.
[7] R. Canetti, S. Halevi and J. Katz, A Forward-secure Public-key Encryption Scheme. In EUROCRYPT, pages 255-271, 2003.
[8] L. Cheung and C. C. Newport, Provably Secure Ciphertext Policy ABE. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 456-465, 2007.
[9] S. S.M. Chow, Token-Controlled Public-Key Encryption in the Standard Model. In ISC 2007, LCNS 4779, pages 315-322, 2007.
[10] R. Cramer and V. Shoup, Design and Analysis of Practical Public-Key Encryption Schemes Secure against Adaptive Chosen
Ciphertext Attack. In SIAM J. Comput., 33(1), pages 167-226, 2004.
[11] C. Galindo and J. Herranz, A Generic Construction for Token-Controlled Public-Key Encryption. In FC 2006, LCNS 4107,
pages 177-190, 2006.
[12] C. Gentry and A. Silverberg, Hierarchical ID-Based Cryptography. In ASIACRYPT, pages 548-566, 2002.
[13] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai and B. Waters, Attribute-Based Encryption for Fine-Grained Access Control of Encrypted Data.
In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 89-98, 2006.
[14] J. Horwitz and B. Lynn, Toward Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption. In EUROCRYPT, pages 466-481, 2002.
[15] A. B. Lewko and B. Waters, New techniques for Dual System Encryption and Fully Secure HIBE with Short Ciphertexts. In
TCC, 2010.
[16] A. B. Lewko, T. Okamoto, A. Sahai and B. Waters, Fully Secure Functional Encryption: Attribute-Based Encryption and
(hierarchical) Inner Porduct Encryption. In EUROCRYPT, volume 6110 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 62-91,
2010.
[17] K. Liang, L. Fang, W. Susilo and Duncan S. Wong, A Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption with Chosen-
Ciphertext Security. In The 5-th International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems (INCoS 2013),
2013.
[18] R. Ostrowski, Paternity Indices. In Forensic Bioinformatics, 2nd Annual Conference, Statistics and DNA Profiling Wright
State University, 2003.
[19] A. Sahai and B. Waters, Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption. In Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT 2005, volume 3494 of
Lectures Notes in Computer Science, pages 457-473, 2005.
14
[20] A. Shamir, Identity-Based Cryptosystems and Signature Schemes. In CRYPTO, pages 47-53, 1984.
[21] B. Waters, Efficient Identity-Based Encryption without Random Oracles. In EUROCRYPT, pages 114-127, 2005.
[22] B. Waters, Dual system Encryption: Realizing Fully Secure IBE and HIBE under Simple Assumptions. In CRYPTO, pages
619-636, 2009.
[23] B. Waters, Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption: an Expressive, Efficient, and Provably Secure Realization. In Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 53-70, 2011.
15
